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L Introduction
The charitable sector in America is comprised of 1,010,365
charitable organizations, with total assets of over $2.045 trillion, and total
revenue of about $942 million.' These organizations are exempt from tax by
§§ 501(c)(3) and 170 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).2
Sections 501(c)(3) and 170, however, operate to subordinate
minority groups. One aspect of the racial subordination instituted by
§§ 501(c)(3) and 170 was presented to the Supreme Court in Bob Jones
University v. United States. The decision in Bob Jones denied tax exempt
status to racially discriminatory private schools.4 Justice Powell wrote a
concurring opinion that highlighted the vital role diversity plays in society,
and the need to protect minority groups from subordination by dominant and
majority agendas.5 A second aspect of racial subordination was not
addressed in Bob Jones, but will be addressed in this Note in order to present
a complete critical analysis of charitable giving in America.
Part I of this Note will lay out the judicial context of the decision in
Bob Jones. It will include a description of the relevant code sections, as well
as important cases and administrative rulings leading up to the Supreme
Court's decision. Part II will summarize the facts of Bob Jones and analyze
the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. Part III will define critical
race theory (CRT), and explain its relevance to the issue in Bob Jones. Part
IV will analyze Powell's jurisprudence, focusing on his view of 501(c)(3) as
a means to cultivate diversity. Part V will detail the racial subordination
instituted by § 170, which was overlooked in Bob Jones. Part VI will
suggest an alternative mechanism for § 170 that compliments Powell's vision
of § 501(c)(3).
I JOINT CoMMrrE ON TAXATION, Historical Dev. & Present Law of the Fed. Tax Exemption
for Charities & Other Tax-Exempt Orgs.: Hearing Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, Apr.
20, 2005, Joint Committee Print, JCX-29-05, Apr. 19, 2005, http://www.novoco.com/Research_Center/
JCTTaxExemptAprilO5.pdf.
2 I.R.C. §§ 170, 501(c)(3) (2005).
3 461 U.S. 574 (1983). In Bob Jones, the United States Supreme Court affirmed an IRS policy
denying tax-exempt status to private schools with racially discriminatory admissions policies, as those
policies violated clearly declared federal policy. Id. at 585, 605. The IRS had previously ruled that a
private school not having a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students was not charitable within the
common law concepts reflected in §§ 170 and 501(c)(3) of the I.R.C. Id. at 579. The IRS based its
decision on the "national policy to discourage racial discrimination in education." Id. To warrant
exemption under § 501(c)(3), the Court noted that an institution must fall within a category specified in
that section and must demonstrably serve and be in harmony with the public interest. Id. at 591. The
institution's purpose must not be so at odds with the common community conscience as to undermine any
public benefit that might otherwise be conferred. Id.
4 Id. at 605.
5 Id. at 606.
CHARITABLE GIVING
II. Tax Benefits for Discriminatory Private Schools
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provides tax
exempt status to any nonprofit organization that is:
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national
or international amateur sports competition . . . or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals... and which does not
participate in, or intervene in... any political campaign on behalf
of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.
6
The general rule of § 170 provides that "[tihere shall be allowed as a
deduction any charitable contribution. ' 7  A charitable contribution is defined
as any contribution to an organization that is exempt from tax under
§ 501(c)(3). 8  There is no express language enacted by Congress in
§§ 501(c)(3) or 170 that denies tax exempt status to racially discriminatory
educational organizations.
Over half a century ago the Supreme Court ruled in Brown v. Board
of Education that racial segregation in education violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 The protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment are limited to state action. 10 The constitutional
prohibition formulated in Brown was limited to racial segregation produced
6 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
7 I.R.C. § 170(a)(1).
I I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B).
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). In Brown, the Court reviewed four state cases in which African-
American minors sought admission to the public schools of their community on a non-segregated basis.
Id. at 486. The common legal question among the cases was whether Plessy should be held inapplicable
to public education and whether segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even
though the physical facilities and other tangible factors were equal, deprived the children of the minority
group of equal educational opportunities. Id. at 489. The Court overturned Plessy v. Ferguson, noting
segregation was a denial of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment and
separate educational facilities were inherently unequal. Id. at 495.; see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954) (holding that federal support for segregated public schools in DC violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
10 U.S. CONsT. amend XIV (1868); Matter of Estate of Wilson, 452 N.E.2d 1228 (N.Y.2d 1983).
"Although there is no conclusive test to determine when state involvement in private discrimination will
violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the general standard that has evolved is whether 'the conduct
allegedly causing the depravation of a federal right [is] fairly attributable to the state."' Id. at 1235. "The
state generally may not be held responsible for private discrimination solely on the basis that it permits the
discrimination to occur. Nor is the state under an affirmative obligation to prevent purely private
discrimination." Id. at 1236.
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by intentional state action.1 Racially discriminatory private schools were
sheltered from the Brown decision because they lacked the requisite state
action. It was clear that such schools could not receive state aid, but it was
unclear whether they could receive tax exempt status from the federal
government.
Surprisingly, or maybe not, Congress did not amend the tax code to
deny exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools. The courts
distinguished state aid from tax benefits, undermining potential equal
protection challenges to discriminatory private schools receiving tax
exemption. 12 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was left with no guidance
on how to administer tax exempt status to racially discriminatory private
schools.
In 1967 the IRS stated that segregated schools that received aid from
a state or political subdivision would be denied tax exemption, but
segregated schools that lacked that minimal connection would be approved
for tax exempt status. 3 That same year, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 67-
325, which denied tax exempt status to a recreational facility that
discriminated on the basis of race. 14  Revenue Ruling 67-325 was the first
time the IRS denied tax exempt status based on racial discrimination, and the
first time the IRS clearly stated that all tax exempt purposes separately
enumerated in § 501(c)(3) must be "charitable."'
' 5
i Brown, 347 U.S. at 495; see also Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (interpreting
the rule in Brown to require a showing of intentional state action to segregate in order to support a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v.
Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976) (holding there is no constitutional duty for a school to remedy segregation
caused by changes in social conditions).
12 Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Com., 275 F. Supp. 833 (D.C. La 1967), afTd,
389 U.S. 571 (1968). The court noted that state tuition grants violated the Fourteenth Amendment, but tax
benefits and free text books did not. Id. at 854; see also Walz v. Tax Com. of New York, 397 U.S. 664
(1970) (holding that the grant of a property tax exemption was insufficient to trigger the First Amendment
separation of church and state).
0 7 A.L.R. Fed. 548, *2a (1971) citing IRS Press Release, Aug. 2, 1967 discussing segregated
schools, the Press Release stated that where "the school is private and does not have such involvement
with the political subdivision as has been determined by the courts to constitute state action for
constitutional purposes, rulings will be issued holding the school exempt and the contributions to it
deductible assuming that all other requirements are met."
14 Rev. Rul. 1967-2 C.B. 113 (IRB 1967). The recreational facility at issue discriminated on the
basis of race, and therefore did not provide a direct benefit to the entire community. The Ruling stated in
relevant part: "Exclusion of a part of the entire community on the basis of race, religion, nationality,
belief, occupation, or other classification having no relationship to the nature or the size of the facility,
would prevent the purpose from being recognized as a sufficient public purpose to justify its being held
charitable under this general body of law." Id.
15 Id. "Charitable defined. The term 'charitable' is used in section 501(c)(3) in its generally accepted
legal sense and is, therefore, not to be construed as limited by the separate enumeration in section
501(c)(3) of other tax-exempt purposes which may fall within the broad outlines of 'charity' as developed
by judicial decisions." Id.
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Soon thereafter, a class action was brought by Black federal
taxpayers and their children who attended public schools in Mississippi.1
6
The Green v. Kennedy plaintiffs obtained a preliminary injunction preventing
the IRS from granting tax exempt status to racially discriminatory private
schools in Mississippi.' 7  In 1971, the same court issued a permanent
injunction prohibiting the IRS from granting tax exempt status to any school
in Mississippi that did not have a nondiscrimination policy.' 8 The opinion
incorporated the broad common law charity requirement into § 501(c)(3), 19
and thus denied tax exempt status to any organization that was illegal or
violated fundamental public policy.
20
In response to these cases the IRS amended its policy because it
could "no longer legally justify" providing tax exempt status to racially
discriminatory private schools. 2' Revenue Ruling 71-447 stated that "a
school asserting a right to the benefits provided for in § 501(c)(3) of the code
as being organized and operated exclusively for educational purposes must
be a common law charity in order to be exempt under that section., 22  In
16 Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970). In Green, African-American plaintiffs
sought injunctive relief against the IRS to prevent the granting of tax exempt status to segregated private
schools in Mississippi. Id. at 1129-30. Plaintiffs argued that I.R.C. §§ 170 and 501 unconstitutionally
supported such schools. Id. at 1130. The IRS argued that if the schools did not receive state or federal
aid, they were entitled to the tax exempt status. Id. The court noted that even if schools did not receive
state or federal aid, the tax exempt status alone was substantial federal financial assistance that was likely
unconstitutional. Id. at 1133-37. The court, in order to preserve the status quo pending the final
determination of the litigation, and to prevent further affirmative action likely to result in irreparable harm
to the parents, enjoined the IRS from granting tax exemptions to private schools in Mississippi unless it
had affirmatively determined on the basis of adequate investigation that the applicant schools did not
discriminate in their admissions policies. Id. at 1138.
17 Id.
is Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971), affd per curiam sub. nom. Coit v.
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). In Connally, plaintiffs sought a declaration that granting tax exempt status to
segregated private schools was violative of the provisions of the I.R.C. §§ 170, 501 were unconstitutional.
Id. at 1155. Dan Coit and others intervened as representatives of the discriminatory schools and
contended that denial of tax exemption violated their First Amendment right to associate in private
schools of their choice. Id. The court declared that § 501(c)(3) did not provide a tax exemption for, and
§ 170(a)-(c) did not provide a deduction for a contribution to, any organization that was operated for
educational purposes unless the school or other educational institution involved had a racially
nondiscriminatory policy as to its students. Id. at 1179. The court issued a permanent injunction against
the IRS enjoining them from awarding a tax exemption or deduction. Id. at 1179-80.
19 IVA W. FRATCHER, SCOTT ON TRUSTS, § 377 (4th ed. 1989). "A trust cannot be created for a
purpose that is illegal. The purpose is illegal if the trust property is to be used for an object that is in
violation of criminal law, . . . or if the accomplishment of the purpose is otherwise against public policy.
Questions of public policy are not fixed and unchanging, but vary from time to time and from place to
place." Id.
20 Connally, 330 F. Supp. at 1156-60. The Connally syllogism is as follows: (1) major premise:
violation of public policy prevents tax exempt status; (2) minor premise: public policy is racial
nondiscrimination; (3) conclusion: racially discriminatory organizations are prevented from having tax
exempt status. Id.
21 Rev. Rul. 1971-2 C.B. 230 (IRB 1971).
22 Id.
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other words, because the common law charity requirement was interpreted to
apply to the 'educational' purpose enumerated in 501(c)(3), an otherwise tax
exempt educational organization would be prevented from receiving tax
exempt status if it violated the public policy of racial nondiscrimination.
In 1972, the IRS set forth a publicity requirement, whereby nonprofit
schools had to affirmatively publicize their nondiscrimination policy to
members of all races in the locality from which their student body was
drawn.23 In 1975, the IRS published a revenue ruling that clarified that
racially discriminatory private church schools could not receive tax exempt
status.
24
III. The Judiciary Steps In
A. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States
Bob Jones University (Bob Jones) is a private school that structured
its courses and policies according to a fundamentalist Christian ideology.25
The school was originally founded in Florida in 1927, but at the time of this
case, the school was located in Greenville, South Carolina.26 The school
believed that the Bible prohibited interracial dating and marriage.27 To
comply with their beliefs, the school refused to admit students who
participated in or condoned interracial relationships.28
In 1970, after the injunction was issued in Green v. Kennedy,29 the
IRS notified Bob Jones that it intended to revoke the tax exempt status of
schools that failed to meet the newly enacted anti-discrimination
23 Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834 (1972) (examples of methods of publication included
publication of the nondiscrimination policy in newspapers of general circulation, use of broadcast media,
publication in school brochures and catalogues, and communication of the policy to leaders of racial
minorities).
24 Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. 158 (1975). "[T]here is no basis for treating separately
incorporated schools that, although church-related, teach secular subjects and generally comply with State
law requirements for public education for the grades which instruction is provided, any differently than
private schools that are not church-affiliated." Id.
25 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 580.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. Bob Jones University excluded all Black applicants until 1971, at which point only
unmarried Blacks were excluded. Id. In 1975, in response to McCrary, the policy was changed to
exclude any applicant married to someone of a different race, or that engaged in or advocated interracial
relationships. Id. at 580-81.; see also McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975), affTd, 427
U.S. 160 (1976) (prohibiting racial exclusion in private schools); Larry King Live, Dr. Bob Jones 111
Discusses the Controversy Swirling Around Bob Jones University, Mar. 3, 2000, http://transcripts.cnn.
com/transcripts/0003/03/lld.00.htm (referring to the University's policy of not allowing interracial dating,
Jones stated: "I don't think it's taking it too far, but I can tell you this, we don't have to have that rule. In
fact, as of today, we have dropped the rule.).
29 Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. at 1140.
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requirement.30 After administrative remedies failed, Bob Jones filed a law
suit.31 In Bob Jones University v. Simon, the Supreme Court denied the
32school's motion to enjoin the IRS from reviewing its tax exempt status.
In early 1976 the IRS revoked Bob Jones' tax exempt status effective
from 1970, when the school was first notified of the anti-discrimination
policy. 33 Bob Jones filed back tax returns for the years 1970 through 1975,
and paid $21 unemployment tax for one employee for 1975.34 After the IRS
refused a requested refund, Bob Jones sued for $21 and was greeted with a
counterclaim for $489,675.59 in back taxes.35 The District Court for the
District of South Carolina ruled that the IRS exceeded its power by enacting
a new requirement into § 501(c)(3).36 Bob Jones got its $21 back.37
A divided Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, but building off
Connally and IRS rulings, affirmed that the common law charity requirement
broadly applied to all exempt purposes under 501(c)(3).38 Bob Jones failed
the common law charity requirement because its discriminatory policies
violated fundamental public policy. The case was remanded, Bob Jones lost
its $21, and the $489,675.59 counterclaim was reinstated.39
Meanwhile, in North Carolina, Goldsboro Christian Schools
(Goldsboro) was operating as a nonprofit despite never having applied for
tax exempt status from the IRS. 40 Goldsboro did not admit Black students.
41
The IRS audited Goldsboro and concluded that it was not a 501(c)(3)
organization and that it owed taxes.42 The school paid taxes for the years
1969 through 1972 and then sued for a refund.43 The IRS counterclaimed for
additional back taxes." On cross motions for summary judgment, the
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina denied Goldsboro's
claim for a refund, granting the IRS motion for summary judgment.45 The
court reasoned that the discriminatory admission policy violated fundamental
Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 581.
Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
Id. at 749 (an injunction requested by Bob Jones was prohibited by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26
§ 7421(a)).
Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 581.
Id. at 581-82.
Id. at 582.
Bob Jones University v. U.S., 468 F. Supp. 890 (D.S.C. 1978).
Id. at 907.
Bob Jones University v. U.S., 639 F.2d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 155.























12 WASH. & LEEJ. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 2 (2006)
public policy and flunked the common law charity requirement. 6  The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had an easy time affirming this case because
Bob Jones, comprised of essentially the same set of facts, was decided
shortly before.47
B. Certiorari Granted, Barely
Members of the Green class action reinstated their law suit from ten
years earlier, alleging that the IRS had failed to comply with the injunction.48
In response to the reopening of the Green litigation, the IRS issued two
proposed revenue procedures that would have enforced substantially more
stringent guidelines for nonprofit private schools to show that they had
adopted a nondiscrimination policy.
49
Congress responded to the proposed revenue procedures by passing
two appropriations riders, the Doman Amendment and the Ashbrook
Amendment.50 The Doman Amendment prohibited the use of any funds to
carry out the IRS proposed revenue procedure of 1978.51 The Ashbrook
Amendment provided that no funds could be used "to formulate or carry out
any rule, policy, procedure, guideline, regulation, standard, court order, or
measure which would cause the loss of tax-exempt status to private,
religious, or church-operated schools under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 unless in effect prior to August 22, 1978. '52 A clear
tension existed between the IRS' agenda and the will of Congress.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to Bob Jones and Goldsboro
in 1981. In January of 1982 the Solicitor General filed a memorandum
with the Court asking that the cases be vacated as moot because the Reagan
46 Id. at 1320. "[The Treasury Department may validly disallow benefits to plaintiff which arise
by virtue of qualification as an organization under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) in that plaintiff's policy of racial
discrimination is patently violative of the declared public policy of the United States." Id.
47 Goldsboro Christian Schs., Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.C. 1977), affd,
644 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1981), afftd, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
48 Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The injunction stated in relevant part: "the
Secretary of the Treasury and Commissioner of Internal Revenue are directed not to grant or restore
federal tax-exempt status... to any school which unlawfully discriminates on the basis of race .. " Id.
49 I.R.S. News Release 2027 (Aug. 22, 1978). These proposed procedures were not
implemented. Id.; I.R.S. News Release 2091 (Feb. 13, 1980). These proposed procedures were not
implemented. Id.
50 Treas. Dept. Appropriations Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-74, 93 Stat. 559 (1980).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Goldsboro Christian Schs., Inc. v. United States, 454 U.S. 892 (1981); Bob Jones University
v. United States, 454 U.S. 892 (1981). But see Prince Edward Sch. Found. v. United States, 478 F. Supp.
107 (D.D.C. 1979), affd per curiam by unpublished order No. 79-1622 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 944 (1981) (dissenting from the denial of certiorari, Powell, Stewart, and Rehnquist
disagreed with the lower court's application of Green in holding that a racially discriminatory school in
Virginia could not be tax exempt).
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Administration had ordered the Treasury Department to revoke Revenue
Ruling 71-447 and all corollary rulings.54 The Treasury was going to refund
the disputed tax payments and recognize Bob Jones and Goldsboro as tax
exempt organizations.55
In February, 1982, the court in Wright v. Regan enjoined the
government from granting tax exempt status to any racially discriminatory
private school, in essence blocking the proposed government action and
preventing the Bob Jones and Goldsboro controversies from becoming
moot.56
C. Supreme Court Decision
1. Burger Majority
The majority opinion in Bob Jones reflected the rationale of the court
in Green v. Connally, which broadly applied a common law charity
requirement to § 501(c)(3).57 Part II A of the decision affirmed the view that
§ 501(c)(3) incorporates the common law charity principle:
Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis that the exempt
entity confers a public benefit . . . to warrant exemption under
501(c)(3), an institution must fall within a category specified in
that section and must demonstrably serve and be in harmony with
the public interest. The institution's purpose must not be so at odds
with the common community conscience as to undermine any
public benefit that might otherwise be conferred. 58
5 Conference List 3, Sheet 5 (Feb. 26, 1982) (on file with the Washington and Lee School of
Law Powell Archives) [hereinafter Conference List]. On January 14, 1981, Bob Jones and Goldsboro
both filed a memoranda in the Supreme Court supporting the government's argument that the cases should
be found moot. Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.; Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In Wright, appellants attending
Memphis public schools sought review of the ruling of the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. Id. at 822. The appeal charged the Secretary of the U.S. Treasury and IRS with failing to
confine tax exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) to private schools that operated on a racially
nondiscriminatory basis. Id. The court noted that appropriations riders staying IRS initiatives would not
preclude the district court from fashioning a remedy. Id. at 832-35. The district judge erred, in this
action, by ruling out a judicial decree going beyond existing IRS guidelines, whereas he had granted such
relief in a reopened companion case. Id. at 835. The court remanded for further proceedings, holding that
the district court erred in dismissing the case. Id. at 822. There could be no tax-exempt status for racially
discriminatory private schools. Id. at 833; Mark Newel, Bench Memorandum, Goldsboro Christian
Schs., Inc. v. United States, 454 U.S. 892 (1981) (No. 81-1) & Bob Jones v. United States, 454 U.S. 892
(1981) (No. 81-3) (Oct. 2, 1982) (on file with the Washington and Lee School of Law Powell Archives).
57 Connally, 330 F. Supp at 1163. "The Code must be construed and applied in consonance with
the Federal public policy against support for racial segregation of schools, public or private." Id.
58 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 591-92.
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Part U B provided a lengthy and detailed discussion establishing the
relatively well settled point that racial discrimination in education violates
fundamental public policy.
59
Part Id C concluded that the IRS acted within its discretion when it
promulgated Revenue Ruling 71-477 and revoked the tax exempt status of
racially discriminatory private schools. 60 The following passage describes
the authority the IRS has to revoke an organization's tax exempt status based
on a public policy limitation:
the IRS has the responsibility.., to determine whether a particular
entity is "charitable" for purposes of § 170 and § 501(c)(3). This in
turn may necessitate later determinations of whether given
activities so violate public policy that the entities involved cannot
be deemed to provide a public benefit worthy of "charitable"
status. We emphasize, however, that these sensitive determinations
should be made only where there is no doubt that the
organization's purpose violates fundamental policy.
61
The decision points out that in this instance, the Judicial, Legislative, and
Executive branches of government displayed an unavoidable and consistent
policy against racial discrimination in education.62 Therefore, there was little
doubt that the IRS acted appropriately in revoking the school's tax exempt
status.63
Part II D addressed the issue of whether the IRS usurped the power
of Congress. The majority concluded that Congress acquiesced to the
revenue ruling and ratified it through its silence.64 The decision states in
relevant part: "Congress' awareness of the denial of tax-exempt status for
racially discriminatory schools when enacting other and related legislation
make out an unusually strong case of legislative acquiescence in and
ratification by implication of the 1970 and 1971 rulings.,
65
The majority decision appeals to the readers' sense of fairness. Few
would argue that the government should provide tax benefits to racially
discriminatory organizations. Powell concurred in the holding, but was
compelled to write a separate opinion. He was concerned that the majority
59 Id. at 592-96.
60 Id. at 596-99.
61 Id. at 597-98.
62 Id. at 598. "The correctness of the Commissioner's conclusion that a racially discriminatory
private school is not charitable within the common law concepts reflected in the Code is wholly consistent
with what Congress, the Executive, and the courts had repeatedly declared before 1970." Id. (internal
citations omitted).
63 Id.
6 Id. at 599.
65 Id.
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had subordinated the critical purpose of 501(c)(3) in its haste to reach the
appropriate result.
2. Powell Concurrence
In Part I of the concurrence, Powell questioned whether the IRS had
the authority to amend §§ 501(c)(3) and 170 to include an anti-discrimination
requirement, but ultimately concluded that the national policy against racial
discrimination in education was so fundamental that it could not be
ignored.66 He agreed that the decade of Congressional acquiescence to the
IRS ruling presented a strong case for ratification by implication.67
While concurring that tax exempt status was unavailable for racially
discriminatory private schools, Powell severely criticized the majority's
incorporation of the common law charity requirement. Powell was
unconvinced that tax exempt status depended on whether the organization
provided a "clear public benefit," or reflected "the views of the 'common
community conscience.'" 68 Powell argued that the primary purpose for tax
exempt status was to promote a pluralistic society, to encourage diverse and
sometimes conflicting viewpoints, and to provide an alternative to
government sanctioned agendas.69
Powell reasoned that Congress had impliedly added an anti-
discrimination requirement, but that it did not delegate to the IRS the
authority to apply a broad common law charity requirement. Powell was
"unwilling to join any suggestion that that the Internal Revenue Service is
invested with authority to decide which public policies are sufficiently
fundamental to require denial of tax exemptions.
70
3. Rehnquist's Dissent
Rehnquist was the lone dissenter. He recognized that racial
discrimination was contrary to fundamental public policy, and agreed that
66 Id. at 607 (stating that "if any national policy is sufficiently fundamental to constitute such an
overriding limitation on the availability of tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3), it is the policy against
racial discrimination in education.").
67 Id.
68 Id. at 609.
69 Id. To illustrate his point that the purpose of diversity would be subordinated by the broad
charity requirement, Powell listed 501(c)(3) organizations that represented views that were not
"demonstrably in harmony with the public interest," including: National Right to Life Educational
Foundation, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Jehovah's Witnesses in the United States, Moral
Majority Foundation, Inc., and the Union of Concerned Scientists Fund, Inc. Id.
70 Id. at 611.
12 WASH. & LEEJ. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 2 (2006)
Congress could deny tax exempt status to segregated private schools.7'
Rehnquist did not agree, however, that Congress had ratified such action
through implication of its inaction.72 Where Congress has failed to act, he
reasoned, the judiciary is not constitutionally empowered to act in its place.73
His opinion provided a concise description of the authority granted to the
IRS, and states in relevant part:
The IRS certainly is empowered to adopt regulations for the
enforcement of [the] specified requirements [of 501(c)(3)] and the
courts have the authority to resolve challenges to the IRS's
exercise of this power, but Congress has left it to neither the IRS
nor the courts to select or add to the requirements of § 501(c)(3).
74
This delineation of the authority granted to the IRS supports the
argument that the IRS exceeded its powers by implementing a public
policy requirement that was not first enacted by Congress.
IV. Critical Race Theory and Its Relevance to Bob Jones
Critical Race Theory (CRT) is a method of analyzing American
society and institutions.75 The guiding principal of CRT is that America is
76fundamentally discriminatory. Dominant groups thrive in a system of
racial disconnect, and establish institutions that erect barriers to change.77
Put another way, American institutions are used to subordinate minority
groups, and to protect the power and privilege of the dominant groups.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 appeared to deconstruct racial barriers
that previously existed in the legal system.78 The laws that prohibited
minorities from participating in commerce and benefiting from the
educational system were dismantled.79 Institutional chains that had held
minority groups back for so long were unlatched and discarded. The legal
system began to embrace the country's cultural diversity. While racial
71 Id. at 612.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 617.
75 See generally Roy L. Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Proposed Structure and Application to
Federal Pleading, 11 HARv. BLACKLrR J. 85 (1994) reprinted in DOROTHY A. BROWN, CRITICAL
RACE THEORY 2 (Thomson West 2003).
76 Id. at 3.
77 Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1331 (1988) reprinted in DOROTHY A. BROWN, CRITICAL
RACE THEORY 27 (Thomson West 2003).
78 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
7 Id.
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diversity and social opportunity advanced, analysis reveals that the law
continued to stifle and constrict minority groups.8°
While many may view the tax code as racially sterile, CRT reveals a
thriving world of racial disconnect and subordination. This may be hard to
imagine, especially in code provisions like §§ 501(c)(3) and 170. Section
501(c)(3) rewards organizations that serve society's need for educational,
scientific, and other charitable purposes.8' Section 170 provides a deduction
for donors who make contributions to 501(c)(3) organizations.82 To view
these provisions critically is to look beyond their apparent purpose and to
focus on the result they produce.
V. Powell's Jurisprudence: Charitable Organizations
A. Frustration with Government Shortfalls
The Court in Bob Jones denied tax exempt status to racially
discriminatory private schools. Most people would cheer this result, but
CRT and Powell would suggest that we hold our applause. Memoranda in
the Powell archive reveal that Powell was frustrated that this case arose in
the posture that it did, believing that Congress should have made its position
clear through legislation.83 Powell's parting words in his concurring opinion
were the following: "There no longer is any justification for Congress to
hesitate-as it apparently has-in articulating and codifying its desired
policy as to tax exemptions for discriminatory organizations. Many questions
remain, such as whether organizations that violate other policies should
receive tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3). '84 It is curious that Congress
never responded to the decision by codifying its policy regarding these
issues.
It is interesting to contrast what Powell thought Congress should
have done, both before and after the Bob Jones decision, with what Congress
actually did. On one hand, Congress failed to codify an anti-discrimination
80 See generally DOROTHY A. BROWN, CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Thomson West 2003).
81 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
82 I.R.C. § 170.
83 Memorandum from Mark Newell to Justice Powell (Mar. 8, 1983) (on file with the
Washington and Lee School of Law Powell Archives). The memorandum criticized a draft of the
majority opinion for not providing "any suggestion that the posture of this case, or the method of
interpreting this statute, is unusual and to be disfavored." Id.
4 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 612. Did Powell's parting call for Congressional action make sense in
light of the effect of the majority opinion?; see George F. Will, Bob Jones U: Why Didn't Congress Act?,
WASH. POST, May 29, 1983, at C7 (stating that "the ruling with which Powell concurs means there is no
reason for Congress to act. Policy is supposedly packed into the concept of a 'charitable' organization,
and Congress supposedly has affirmed, by acquiescence, the IRS's power to unpack the policy.") (on file
with author).
12 WASH. & LEEJ. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 2 (2006)
policy into the Code. Congress also attached the Doran and Ashbrook
Amendments to the Appropriations Act, which effectively prevented the IRS
from changing its prior practice of granting tax exempt status to racially
discriminatory private schools. Also, the initial position of the Reagan
Administration was to revoke Revenue Ruling 71-477, refund Bob Jones'
and Goldsboro's taxes, and make them tax exempt organizations again.86
On the other hand, Congress had passed the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act, all of which
reflected a strong agenda to remedy racial discrimination. The Reagan
Administration retracted its initial push to preserve tax benefits for
discriminatory private schools. The government's inability to maintain a
universal agenda is a reflection of the racial division that continued to
pervade society.
B. The Danger of a Public Policy Limitation
Powell's § 501(c)(3) jurisprudence is primarily concerned with
preserving the provision's purpose of cultivating diverse organizations. The
fear is that the imposition of a broad public policy requirement onto
§ 501(c)(3) can subordinate minority groups that do not fit in the status quo.
Government sanctioned agendas and dominant orthodoxy might suffocate
alternative views and underground movements.
Section 501(c)(3)'s purpose of promoting diversity is well supported
in the case law and academia. The Connally decision cited the following
words of Judge Friendly:
Philanthropy is a delicate plant whose fruits are often better than
its roots; desire to benefit one's own kind may not be the noblest
of motives but it is not ignoble. It is the very possibility of doing
something different than government can do, of creating an
institution free to make choices government cannot-even
seemingly arbitrary ones-without having to provide a
justification that will be examined in a court of law, which
stimulates much private giving and interest.
87
Current academia views § 501(c)(3) as an alternative to government policy,
and not an extension thereof. For example, Joel Newman describes the
charitable deduction as an "escape valve" for the taxpayer who "disapproves
85 Treas. Dept. Appropriations Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-74, 93 Stat. 559 (1980).
86 Conference List 3, supra note 54.
87 Connally, 330 F. Supp. at 1162-63 citing Henry J. Friendly, The Dartmouth College Case and
the Public-Private Penumbra, 12 TExAs QUARTERLY (2d Supp.) 141, 171 (1969).
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of the way government is spending money., 88  Yet the majority opinion
requires that tax exempt status be denied if the entity has practices that are
"contrary to established public policy," or "contrary to settled public policy,"
or violates "a fundamental public policy."
8 9
Even more alarming, the IRS is given the authority to make these
determinations. Powell stated that the IRS's "business is to administer the
laws designed to produce revenue for the Government, not to promote
'public policy.' As former IRS Commissioner Kurtz has noted, questions
concerning religion and civil rights 'are far afield from the more typical tasks
of tax administrators-determining taxable income.' 
90
No tax scholars suggest that private racial discrimination should be
exempt from tax. That limitation, however, should be embodied by an
express enactment by Congress. The Court's resolution in Bob Jones
provided an overreaching remedy that unnecessarily impedes diversity by
restricting all charitable purposes to those that match the majority orthodoxy.
Referring to the more than 106,000 organizations that qualified as
§ 501(c)(3) organizations in 1981, Powell wrote:
I find it impossible to believe that all or even most of those
organizations could prove that they "demonstrably serve and [are]
in harmony with the public interest" or that they are "beneficial
and stabilizing influences in our community life." . . . In my
opinion, such a view of § 501(c)(3) ignores the important role
played by tax exemptions in encouraging diverse, indeed often
sharply conflicting, activities and viewpoints. As Justice Brennan
has observed, private, nonprofit groups receive tax exemptions
because "each group contributes to the diversity of association,
viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic
society." . . . [T]he provision of tax exemptions to nonprofit
groups is one indispensable means of limiting the influence of
governmental orthodoxy on important areas of community life. 91
Powell could not reconcile the rationale of the majority opinion with what he
perceived to be the main purpose of § 501(c)(3). A requirement to serve
government interest cannot be merged with the purpose of providing
alternatives to government policy.
Powell's § 501(c)(3) jurisprudence embraced aspects of
asymmetrical equality, the model of equality most in line with CRT. The
88 JOEL S. NEWMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 504 (West Group 2002).
89 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. 574.
90 Id. at 611 citing Jerome Kurtz, Difficult Definitional Problems in Tax Administration: Religion
and Race, 23 CATHOLIC LAWYER 301 (1978).
91 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 609.
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asymmetrical model of equality "embraces racial differences '[a]nd rejects
the notion that all [racial] differences are likely to disappear, or even that
they should.'"9 2 Powell recognized the value of diverse groups in American
society. He warned against administrative oversight of tax exempt
organizations because it would require conformity to government policies.
The majority has discretion to define fundamental public policy, and that
allows the dominant groups to select which organizations should receive the
tax exempt privilege.
The fundamental public policy requirement pronounced in Bob
Jones has not been narrowly defined or broadly applied by the IRS. David
Brennen analyzed IRS technical advice memorandums concerning the public
policy limitation for § 501(c)(3) organizations and found that the IRS relies
almost entirely on Supreme Court constitutional law jurisprudence to define
public policy. 93  As long as a § 501(c)(3) organization does not violate
constitutional law concepts of fundamental public policy, the IRS will not
revoke its tax exempt status. Brennen notes that the trend in constitutional
law towards a race neutral strict scrutiny test for the Equal Protection Clause
may actually hinder government efforts to "achieve social justice through
elimination of both current discrimination and lingering effects of past
discrimination." 94
C. Contemporary Issue: Hurricane Katrina
When Hurricane Katrina ravaged the Gulf Coast, television viewers
were inundated with alarming images. The footage revealed the "invisible
poor" to America. 95 The transparency of racial discrimination temporarily
dissolved and racial subordination became remarkably visible.96 Questions
arose whether the state, local, and federal government's fatally slow response
to save the "invisible poor" was a result of racial discrimination.
Dissatisfied with government action, taxpayers had the option to
contribute funds to one of the many diverse organizations that exist under
92 Brooks, supra note 75.
93 David A. Brennen, Symposium: The Intersection of Race, Corporate Law, and Economic
Development: Race-Conscious Affirmative Action by Tax-Exempt 501(c)(3) Corporations After Grutter
and Gratz, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 711 (2003).
94 Id. For example, if the Court ruled that affirmative action was unconstitutional, then schools
could not take race into account in admissions and continue to be tax exempt.
95 Theodore M. Shaw, Katrina Exposes the "Invisible Poor," NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND,
Sept. 9, 2005, www.naacpldf.org/content.aspx?article=674. The article describes how the "invisible poor"
who were left to perish in the hellish aftermath of the hurricane were "overwhelmingly black." Id.
96 Id. "Katrina exposed the issue of race once again, as it did the issue of class. While the news
cycle is short and this momentary candor is already fading, the underlying realities of race and class
remain." Id.
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§ 501(c)(3). To the extent the IRS refrains from narrowly defining public
policy, nonprofit organizations are free to employ policies that are contrary
to government policy. In the context of Hurricane Katrina, policies contrary
to the government's would have responded better to the plight of minority
groups whose welfare was not adequately addressed.
The American Red Cross (Red Cross) is a tax exempt 501(c)(3)
organization. In the weeks following Hurricane Katrina, the Red Cross spent
more than $521 million dollars in providing relief for victims, and expected
to spend $2 billion on hurricane relief in all.97 CRT suggests that we also
critically analyze the Red Cross, which is such a large organization that it
resembles an American institution. Does the Red Cross operate to
subordinate minority groups? Many hurricane survivors and local nonprofit
groups have observed that "Red Cross services have been easier to come by
in white, affluent neighborhoods than in poorer, minority neighborhoods.
98
In response to the Red Cross' apparent subordination of rural, poor
minorities, black charity leaders in the area have created alternative
organizations to the Red Cross, including the Saving Our Selves coalition. 99
Often those who are subordinated by racial disconnect are in the best
position to articulate the ways in which society discriminates.' With this in
mind, consider the following words from LaTosha Brown, director of the
Alabama Coalition on Black Civic Participation:
Many people think that organizations like the Red Cross and
United Way are for the most part the organizations that are serving
our community right now. Although they are doing good work and
have quite a bit of experience in this area it is important that we
recognize their limitations.... Each of us have seen the callus,
unrighteous, and racist relief response by the federal government
and local agencies to the hurricane victims. It is imperative that we
never allow ourselves again to become totally dependent on a
system that will allow us to die from dehydration and simple
97 Nicole Wallace, Where Should the Money Go?, THE CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHROPY: SPECIAL
REPORT, Sept. 2005, http:llphilanthropy.com/free/articles/v17/i24/24000901.htm.
98 Id.
99 Save Our Selves After Katrina Community Relief Project, http://www.sosafterkatrina.org/
mission statement.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2006); Bruce Dixon, Rescue Came From Grass Roots: The
People, Not FEMA Saved Themselves, www.blackcommentator.com/151/151_dixon-katrina.html (last
visited Feb. 14, 1006). The Save Our Selves coalition includes the following nonprofits: Alabama
Coalition on Black Civic Participation, Malcolm X Grassroots Movement, One For Life, Southern
Christian Leadership Conference, The Ordinary People's Society, and others. Id.
100 Brooks, supra note 75.
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neglect as the world watches. We must become much better
prepared to "Save Our Selves."'
0'
LaTosha Brown encourages people to seek out and contribute to community
based organizations that advocate equality and represent the interests of
subordinated minority groups. Hopefully the tax code also encourages these
grass root movements that remedy government oppression.
An analysis of the policies of the government, the Red Cross, and the
Save Our Selves Coalition with respect to Hurricane Katrina has revealed a
startling inverse relationship. The further policy moves away from
government policy, the closer it comes to helping subordinated minority
groups. The defect in the public policy requirement of § 501(c)(3) is that the
farther policy moves away from government or public policy, the more likely
it is fail the requirements to be tax exempt under § 501(c)(3).
Arguably government policy in the context of Hurricane Katrina was
not in accord with fundamental public policy, but remember that for the
purposes of § 501(c)(3) the IRS determines the scope of public policy.
Should the ability of minority organizations to receive tax exemptions ever
be in the hands of a government that can so clearly operate to subordinate
minority groups? Powell's § 501(c)(3) jurisprudence would answer that it
should not.
VI. Extension of Powell's Jurisprudence: Charitable Deductions
Powell's jurisprudence in Bob Jones displayed a heightened
awareness of the important role diversity plays in American society, and the
need to encourage the creation and maintenance of diverse charitable
organizations. He was sensitive to the dominant groups' propensity to
subordinate minority groups. To protect minority groups from subordination,
he argued against the inclusion of administrative oversight and a public
policy limitation for §§ 501(c)(3) and 170. In that regard, Powell's
jurisprudence represents a racially critical analysis of legal issues. A
complete critical race theory analysis, however, requires an additional step
not taken by Powell.
A. Section 170 and Inequitable Rights and Privileges
Section 170 provides a deduction for contributions made to a
501(c)(3) organization. Section 170 inherently privileges dominant groups
101 LaTosha Brown, Hurricane Katrina Letter, Black Leadership Forum (2005), http://www.black
leadershipforum.org/katrina.html.
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and subordinates minority groups. The mechanics of § 170 can be illustrated
in the following example: when a taxpayer in a 35% tax bracket contributes
$100 to the Red Cross, he or she qualifies for a $100 deduction under § 170.
What has essentially happened is the individual contributed $65 dollars to the
Red Cross and the federal government contributed a matching grant of $35.
The deduction gives the taxpayer the right to determine which organizations
should receive federal funds through indirect federal subsidies. 10 2 The right
to direct federal funds is significant considering that the Joint Committee on
Taxation estimates that the government will subsidize 501(c)(3)
organizations with $228 billion through § 170 deductions over the fiscal
years 2005-2009. 03
Tax scholars generally praise § 170 because "the charitable
contribution deduction promotes pluralism [by allowing] ... individuals [to]
control the uses to which the federal funds will be put, free of governmental
directive or control. ''t°4 Indeed, individuals will have control over the purse
strings of $228 billion that would otherwise be federal revenue. Not all
individuals, however, have the ability to participate.
10 5
To see the discrimination you have to understand how the deduction
works. In general, taxpayers are allowed to receive $3,100 exempt from
income tax. °6 A taxpayer has the option of taking a standard deduction or
itemized deductions. 10 7  The standard deduction for a single individual is
102 Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983). "Both tax
exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax system. A tax
exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have
to pay on its income. Deductible contributions are similar to cash grants of the amount of a portion of the
individual's contributions." Id.; see also C. Eugene Steuerle & Martin A. Sullivan, Toward More Simple
and Effective Giving: Reforming the Tax Rules for Charitable Contributions and Charitable
Organizations, 12 Am. J. TAX POL'Y 399 (1995) (noting that "the charitable deduction provides the
economic equivalent of a matching grant from the government to the charity of a donor's choice.");
Nancy C. Staudt, Taxation Without Representation, 55 TAX L. REv. 555, 572 (2002) (stating that "the
taxpayer is simply the paying agent for the government's share.").
103 Joint Committee Print, JCX-29-05 (Apr. 19, 2005).
104 Staudt, supra note 102, at 573 (citing Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for
Charitable Contributions: A Substitute for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L. REV. 377 (1972)).
105 Staudt, supra note 102, at 597. "Congress awards subsidies that are more valuable to high
income taxpayers than to middle and low income taxpayers and absolutely worthless to those who pay no
taxes." Id.
106 I.R.C. § 151. Taxpayers are allowed a personal exemption as a deduction in computing taxable
income. The deduction is set by statute at $2,000, however, it is adjusted for inflation based on the cost-
of-living adjustment determined under I.R.C. § 1(0(3). The exemption amount for 2004 is $3,100. The
deduction is phased out for taxpayers whose adjusted gross income exceeds the threshold amount
provided for in the statute.
107 I.R.C. § 63(e). "Unless an individual makes an election under this subsection for the taxable
year, no itemized deduction shall be allowed for the taxable year." Id.
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$4,850.108 If a taxpayer takes the standard deduction, combined with the
personal exemption, they can effectively receive $7,950 that is not subject to
income taxation.' °9 Alternatively, a taxpayer may decide to forgo the
standard deduction and use available itemized deductions, like the charitable
contribution deduction. 0
The first sign of discrimination is that low income taxpayers who
itemize their deductions receive less benefit from § 170 than high income
taxpayers who itemize their deductions."' This results from the progressive
tax rates in place. It will cost a taxpayer in a 40% bracket 60 after tax dollars
to make a $100 contribution to their 501(c)(3) of choice. In contrast, it will
cost a taxpayer in a 15% bracket 85 after tax dollars to make the same $100
contribution to their chosen 501(c)(3). 112 High income taxpayers who
itemize their deductions receive a disproportionate benefit from § 170, and in
turn the 501(c)(3) organizations that they support will receive more federal
funds."13
The example above compares high and low income taxpayers who
itemize their deductions, and illustrates that § 170 privileges high income
taxpayers over middle and low income taxpayers. It is even more alarming,
however, that § 170 is completely worthless to individuals who do not
itemize their deductions or do not pay income tax."
4
The racial disconnect implicated by the tying the § 170 deduction to
the income tax is startling. In her Note, Nancy Staudt observed:
Congress has implemented a series of provisions that operate to
exclude nearly all individuals in the two lowest quintiles of income
from income taxation. The policy of excluding the poor, however,
has had less salience in the design of other tax provisions.
Congress explicitly imposed Social Security taxes on all workers
regardless of their income, as well as an array of indirect costs on
consumers through the adoption of more than 50 federal excise
108 I.R.C. § 63(c). The standard deduction is only available for taxpayers who do not itemize their
deductions. The amount of the standard deduction is adjusted for inflation based on the cost-of-living
adjustment determined under I.R.C. § I (0(3), and is $4,850 for a single individual in 2004.
109 This figure is the sum of the indexed personal exemption and the indexed standard deduction
for a single individual who is not subject to the phase out provision of I.R.C. § 151.
I10 I.R.C. § 63(e) (election); I.R.C. § 170 (charitable contribution deduction).
i Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 102, at 404. The rate of the matching grant is positively rated
to the donor's marginal income tax rate. Id.
112 See id. at 447 n.3 (noting that "the matching grant rate can be represented algebraically with
the formula m = t/(l-t) where t is the donor's marginal tax rate."). A donor with a 40-percent tax rate
makes available 67 cents of public funds for every $1 donated. Id. A donor in the 15 percent tax bracket
makes available 15/85, or approximately 20 cents, of public funds for every $1 donated. Id.
113 But see I.R.C. § 68 (overall limitation on itemized deductions for taxpayers with income
greater than the applicable amount of $100,000, adjusted for inflation).
114 Staudt, supra note 102, at 597.
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taxes.... Congress has exempted the poor from the income tax -
the most visible tax-and at the same time subjected them to the
hidden and indirect forms of taxations such as social insurance,
corporate, and excise taxes .... [I]t is no surprise that Americans
(including the affected individuals) view those who pay only the
most hidden and indirect taxes as paying no taxes at all." 
5
Staudt's analysis was limited to economic class stratification and did not
critically discuss the racial impact of the tax provisions. Nevertheless, her
research is invaluable to a racially critical analysis because the subordination
of low income earners disproportionately affects minority groups. A recent
press release from the U.S. Census Bureau News stated that "[B]lack
households had the lowest median income in 2004 ($30,134) among race
groups."' 16 The press release also disclosed that the 2004 poverty rate for
blacks was 24.7% and for Hispanics was 21.9%, compared to a poverty rate
of 8.6% for non-Hispanic whites. 17 The census information reveals that
subordinated racial groups disproportionately represent impoverished
Americans in the lowest two quintiles of income. While these Americans do
not pay income tax, they continue to pay money to the government in the
form of hidden taxes.' 18  Tying the § 170 deduction to the income tax
effectively denies the minority invisible poor the political privilege to
designate where federal funds should go.
The resulting racial disconnect perpetuates the epidemic of racial
discrimination in America. Minority groups are obligated to pay taxes,
visible and hidden, to the same government that subordinates them in
society. The following further illustrates the discriminatory effect caused by
tying § 170 to the income tax:
Empirical data indicates charitable beneficiaries are not identical
for low and high income individuals. Low income individuals tend
to contribute to community churches while high income
individuals contribute to private educational institutions.
Excluding low income individuals from using the tax preference,
therefore, denies them the ability to subsidize their own favored
15 Id. at 585.
116 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS, PRESS RELEASE: INCOME STABLE,
POVERTY RATE INCREASES, PERCENTAGE OF AMERICANS WrrHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE UNCHANGED,
Aug. 30, 2005, http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/income-wealthO05647.
html.
117 Id.
11 Staudt, supra note 102, at 597.
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community organizations, organizations that are more likely to
benefit them on a day-to-day basis. 119
It is disturbing that the mechanics of § 170 exclude minority groups from
directing government funds to the organizations that could provide them the
greatest benefits. For example, the subordinated "invisible poor" in the Gulf
Coast region have little to no ability to direct federal funds to organizations
in the Save Our Selves coalition, possibly the only organizations that will not
subordinate them in the relief and rebuilding effort.
Note that high income individuals tend to make contributions to
private educational institutions and cultural charities such as museums,
public television and symphonies. 12  A prominent view of charitable giving
is that the donor provides contributions to organizations that are most likely
to provide reciprocal benefits. 121  In connection to this view, Tom Izzo
concluded that "studies indicate that wealthy tax payers disproportionately
benefit from services provided by the cultural charities ... to which they
allocate public money." 122 Low income groups tend to contribute to religious
institutions and community welfare organizations that provide them with the
greatest, and most direct reciprocal benefit. 1
23
The charities that receive deductible charitable contributions benefit
from indirect federal subsidies. Section 170, however, inequitably
apportions the right to take deductions depending on income. Under the
reciprocal benefit view of charitable giving, this inequitable right under
§ 170 privileges high income taxpayers with the ability to disproportionately
direct public funds to organizations that provide them return benefits. Over
the next four years, high income taxpayers will have the greatest say in
directing $228 billion of federal funds to organizations.' 24 Meanwhile low
income taxpayers, who are most in need of aid, will lack an equal right to
direct those funds to organizations that would facilitate their welfare on a
day-to-day basis, such as the Save Our Selves coalition.
119 Id. at 600 n.3; see generally JULIAN WOLPERT, PATrERNS OF GENEROSITY IN AMERICA 23-36
(1993).
120 Todd Izzo, A Full Spectrum of Light: Rethinking the Charitable Contribution Deduction, 141
U. PA. L. REV. 2371 (1993).
121 See generally CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING 11,
37 (1985).
122 Izzo, supra note 120 (citing Ronald E. Frank & Marshall G. Greenberg, THE PUBLIC'S USE OF
TELEVISIONS 175 (1980)); Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA.
L. REV. 1393, 1446 & n.186 (1988).
123 CLOTFELTER, supra note 121, at 37-38 ("[m]utual-aid associations and churches, both
characterized by aid or assistance among members, have high components of reciprocal giving. According
to this view, philanthropy and everyday helping behavior are part of an informal mutual insurance pact
124 Joint Committee Print, JCX-29-05 (Apr. 19, 2005).
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VII. Solutions
Section 170 inequitably apportions the right to direct public funds to
high income taxpayers. Low income taxpayers and non-filers are denied an
equal right, and as a result they and the charitable organizations that provide
them reciprocal benefits are subordinated. There is a clear racial
undercurrent because racial minority groups disproportionately represent the
poor in America.
A. Deduction for Non-Itemizers
The Tax Relief Act of 2005 included a provision that amends § 170
to include the new subsection 170(o), which states in relevant part:
In the case of an individual who does not itemize deduction for
any taxable year beginning after December 31, 2005, and before
January 1, 2008, there shall be taken into account as a direct
charitable deduction under section 63 an amount equal to the
amount allowable under subsection (a) for the taxable year for
cash contributions. 1
25
A charitable deduction for non-itemizers was previously in place from 1982
to 1986, but the provision was repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986.126
The amount of charitable contributions by non-itemizers increased
significantly during that period.
127
This solution is on the right track, but falls short. The deduction for
non-itemizers fails to remedy the denial of equal rights to non-filers. These
people represent the "invisible poor," and they will continue to be
subordinated under a system that conditions the political privilege of
directing public funds to the filing of income tax returns. This solution also
fails to address the disproportionate benefit of the deduction to high income
tax payers who are taxed at higher marginal rates.
125 Tax Relief Act of 2005, Title IH, Subtitle A, Sec. 301, S.2020 (2005). To take a deduction total
contributions must be greater that $210 for a single individual. Itemizers are allowed to deduct both cash
and non-cash contributions. The provisions are intended to be in place for a two-year period.
126 The Charitable Contribution Deduction for Nonitemizers, http://www.independentsector.org/
programs/gr/nonitemizer.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2006).
127 Id. "Nonitemizers contributed $9.5 billion to charity in 1985, when they were allowed to
deduct 50% of their contributions. In 1986, when they were allowed to deduct 100% of their
contributions, giving increased by nearly 40% to $13.4 billion." Id.
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B. Refundable Credit
A superior solution is the use of a refundable credit.128  The
mechanics of a refundable credit are such that it is available to individuals
that itemize deductions, individuals that take the standard deduction, and
individuals that pay no income tax. 129  A refundable credit remedies the
disproportionate subsidy of high income taxpayer's contributions, provides
subsidies for non-filers, and will not result in a loss of tax revenue because
the additional benefit to low income individuals corresponds to a reduction in
the benefit to high income itemizers.
30
The following example is intended to illustrate the mechanics of the
solution. The refundable credit will be set at a rate that remains constant
irrespective of income. If the rate is set at 15%, every individual that
contributes $100 to a 501(c)(3) organization will receive a $15 tax credit,
irrespective of income or filing status.
All individuals that make charitable contributions will receive an
identical percentage as a credit, and therefore, every American will have an
equal right to direct government subsidies to charities of their choice.
Taxpayers with high marginal rates will have the same credit-percentage as
non-filers.
Empirical studies show that the price elasticity of charitable
contributions is constant throughout income levels.1 3' This allows
economists to calculate a credit amount that will maintain current revenue
and the sum total of charitable giving will remain constant.132 Thus, a shift
from a deduction to a credit will not decrease federal tax revenue or
charitable contributions. It will, however, equitably apportion to all
Americans the right to direct federal subsidies to charities of their choosing.
128 A refundable tax credit is not limited by an individual's tax liability. Whereas a typical tax
credit cannot reduce tax liability below zero, a refundable tax credit can, thus an individual can receive the
credit even if they have no income.
129 I.R.C. § 32 (earned income tax credit).
130 See generally Izzo, supra note 120.
131 ROY J. RuFFIN & PAUL R. GREGORY, PRINCIPLES IN MICROECONOMIcs G-9 (3d ed. 1988)
(price elasticity is defined as a fraction, the numerator of which is the "percentage change in the quantity
demanded," and the denominator of which is "the percentage change in price"); Martin Feldstein, The
Income Tax and Charitable Contributions: Part 11 - The Impact on Religious, Educational and Other
Organizations, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 209-10 (1975) ("the econometric evidence indicates that the price
elasticity of giving... does not differ significantly among income groups . .. "); Peter J. Wiedenbeck,
Charitable Contributions: A policy Perspective, 50 Mo. L. REv. 85, 101 (1985) ("The data reveal that
price elasticity... does not vary significantly through a wide range of incomes.").
132 Wiedenback, supra note 131, at 101 ("the substitution of a . . . credit would yield
approximately the same total aggregate giving at the same revenue cost as the current deduction, even
though the credit would present the same cost of giving to all taxpayers.").
CHARITABLE GIVING
VIII. Conclusion
Justice Powell's jurisprudence focused on a charitable sector in
America that represented all groups. He was concerned that giving the IRS
authority to revoke tax exempt status through a broad public policy limitation
would lead to subordination of minority views. While the IRS continues to
have this authority, they do not exercise it beyond the parameters of
fundamental public policy as defined by Supreme Court constitutional
jurisprudence.
Section 170 continues to subordinate the "invisible poor" minorities
by denying them the privilege that dominant groups have to direct billions of
dollars of federal funds to subsidize organizations that provide them with
reciprocal benefits. A refundable credit would remedy this disparity, and
give proper value and rights to diverse groups.
"A distinctive feature of America's tradition has been respect for
diversity. This has been characteristic of the peoples from numerous lands
who have built our country. It is the essence of our democratic system.
' 33
Justice Powell's jurisprudence requires us to reevaluate the current system of
charitable giving in America, and reconsider its respect for diversity.
' Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 610 citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 485 U.S. 718, 745
(1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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